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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IN WASEINGTON*
In Plymouth, Rubber. Co. v. West Coast Rubber Co.' 6 the cred-
itor was suing for an alleged balance due. The debtor's defense
was based on his check, accepted and cashed by the creditor, for
part of the account, plus tender of merchandise for the balance.
The check was sent with a letter stating in effect that the debtor
was unable to dispose of all the goods, purchase of which gave rise
to the obligation in question, because the creditor had flooded the
local market with inferior goods sold at a lesser price. "We are,
therefore, compelled to return these Toesans for credit and ask
that you kindly render us credit for whatever we return." The
court said
"It is true neither the check nor the letter expressly
stated that the tender of the money and the property was
in full payment or satisfaction of the whole debt, or that
both must be either accepted or rejected, but such are the
necessary inferences."
The court in Hotel Randolph Co. v. John C. Watrous Co. 5 7 found
a conditional tender, apparently from the fact that the creditor's
attorney, after receipt by the creditor of a check for less than
the alleged sum due, called on the debtor prior to cashing the
check and was informed that it was to be in full settlement of the
account. The check when sent evidently had no notation to the
effect it was in full payment, but was accompanied by a statement
showing the charges and credits winch were used by the debtor
in computing the sum he claimed to be due, the statement being
noted. "Check to balance."' 81
Notwithstanding a notation on the check reciting that it is m
full payment of the account or of the items indicated in an ac-
companying voucher the creditor may after cashing it show by
parol that the parties did not intend the check to be a final settle-
ment. In Phelps Lumber Co. v. Bradford-Kennedy Co.59 the
defendant pleaded accord and satisfaction and put in evidence
various checks sent to and cashed by the plaintiff, each marked "In
full settlement of account below." The defense was denied because
I Note 13, supra.
'Note 40, supra.
"In Thomas W Simmens & Co. v. Northwesterm Junk Co., 124 Wash.
61, 213 Pac. 485 (1923) the debtor tendered a statement and check for
the balance shown thereon, saying "there, take it or leave it." The creditor
took it; the court concluded there was an accord and satisfaction. The
statement in a letter accompanying a check that "This will settle your
account with this company in full" was m Bottorf v. A. E. PXge Machinery
Co., note 46, supra, deemed sufficient to make the tender conditional.
r96 Wash. 503, 165 Pac. 376 (1917).
* Continued from last issue.
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"The trial judge found that, notwithstanding the form of
these voucher checks, they had been received with an un-
derstanding on the part of the payee that the differences
existing between the parties were to be settled later on."
The creditor in LeDoux v. Seattle, etc., Shpbui7ding CoY' had
accepted a check bearing this notation "In full settlement to date
of all expenses and services rendered " The trial court found
as a fact that the remittance was intended by the parties to be
part payment only, the appellate court declined to upset that
finding-
"Where there is an agreement that a certain sum shall be
paid on account and not in full settlement, the sending of
a check which shows that it is in full settlement does not,
as a matter of law, accomplish an accord and satisfaction.
We think, therefore, that the court properly received
this testimony "
Objections based on the parol evidence rule are answered by
analogy to the receipt cases. 6 1
An interesting and somewhat similar problem was presented in
Ingram v. Sauset.6 2 Plaintiff was suing for an alleged balance
due under a contract. Defendant pleaded accord and satisfaction
based on a check sent to and cashed by the plaintiff. Defendant
had prepared a statement of what he considered the proper account
and had sent it to plaintiff with a check for the balance shown on
the statement. No notation of any kind was attached to the check
or indicated in the statement. The court said
" respondent testified in effect that he received the
idea from the statement and check that Sauset intended
that the check should be payment in full, that he (re-
spondent) was unwilling to so accept it, and advised his
attorney to cash the check only in the event that it could
be safely accepted and treated as a payment on account.
From this it is argued that respondent, knowing the check
was intended as payment in full, is as much bound thereby
as though the statement or check, one or both, bore a
Note 47, supra. In Glenz v. Tacoma RV. & Power Co., note 36, supra,
voucher checks endorsed by the creditor were held not conclusive and
he recovered an additional amount.
01 In the Phelps case the court while not referring specifically to the
parol evidence rule based its holding on Allen v. Tacoma Mill Co., 18
Wash. 216, 51 Pac. 372 (1897) a decision which held parol evidence ad-
missible to controvert a receipt. Allen v. Tacoma Mill Co., was cited also
in the LeDoux case. The propriety of an analogy between accord and
satisfaction cases and receipt cases is questionable. It would seem that
the contractual elements of accord and satisfaction clearly distinguish
the two types of case.
"Note 50, supra.
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written notice of the maker's intention. The argument is
plausible, but we think unsound the meeting of the
minds so as to create an agreement of.the parties is an
essential feature. The fallacy of the appellant's posi-
tion lies m this. first, whatever Sauset's intention, the
check was not offered in full satisfaction of the demand,
though respondent thought that Sauset intended or hoped
it would be so accepted, no conditions accompanied it
and there was nothing to indicate that it might not, in
the event that the payee declined to accept it as full pay-
ment, be applied on account. Second, there is nothing
in the record to indicate that respondent accepted the
check as full payment."
The court's conclusion rested on an interpretation of the facts.
It would seem possible to find under facts like these that a con-
dition was imposed, imposed, not by the debtor's subjective intent,
but by his conduct and the effect of such conduct on the creditor.
If the creditor as a reasonable man would be bound to know when
he received the statement and check under the circumstances in
question that the debtor intended the check as a tender of full
settlement, the creditor should be bound just as though the check
stated expressly "In full settlement" The debtor has surely made
known to the creditor, objectively, his intent that the creditor's
right to retain the check be contingent upon is accepting it in
full satisfaction of his claim. The court in Plymouth Rubber Co.
v. West Coast Rubber Co.,63 we think, better states the rule.
... payment by the debtor of an amount less than that
claimed -by the creditor, and the receipt by the latter of
such amount under such circumstances as that he is bound
to know that the intention was to make the payment in
full of all demands, will discharge the whole claim "
The creditor is bound by acceptance of the check tendered con-
ditionally irrespective of knowledge by him of the legal conse-
quences following such acceptance.6 4
Although the general rule is that the creditor who retains for
an unreasonable time the check tendered to hin conditionally will
be held to have accepted it"s the Washington court in Katick v.
Evweh6 reached a contrary result. The plaintiff sued to recover
an alleged balance due as his share of the profits from a fishing
03Note 13, supra.
"First. National Bank v. White-Dulaney Co., note 40, supra: "It is
not necessary that it be shown that the respondent or its officers knew
the legal result of their acceptance of the check, as the mere acceptance
will be regarded as assent."
' WniasTox ox CoNTrAcTs, see. 1854.
11161 Wash. 581, 297 Pac. 762 (1931).
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voyage. He was discharged early in the season, at which time
defendant sent him a check for $67.20 "accompanied by a state-
ment showing that that was the balance due the respondent up
to the time he was discharged." In a letter accompanying the
check it was recited that the check and statement were enclosed
"for your one share of the fish caught on the boat Avalon up
to August 3, 1929." Plaintiff kept the check and put it in evi-
dence in this action. The court concluded that "at the time ap-
pellant sent the same (check) he did not inform respondent that
it was intended to be considered as full payment." (Just how
this conclusion was reached in view of the letter which accom-
panied the check is not clear.) The court continued "In this
case, it should be observed that the respondent did not cash the
check." The instant case was then distinguished from prior cases
wherein a discharge by accord and satisfaction was found, be-
cause "In each of those cases the check sent was cashed." Katch
v. Evwch seems to be the only Washington decision discussing this
particular point.
Where the conditional payment was made in money, however,
it has been held that failure to return the payment promptly to
the debtor binds the creditor to an acceptance of the tender and
accord and satisfaction results.
6 7
Effect of an Executory Accord on the Origmal Cause of Action
The debtor and creditor when entering into an accord may m-
tend one of two things (1) that the accord itself shall be substi-
tuted for the original cause of action, or (2) that performance
by the debtor of the accord will discharge the claim. In the ab-
sence of express language to the contrary in the accord the latter
will be presumed.6" In the first situation the original claim is
immediately discharged ;6 should the debtor default on the accord
the creditor's only recourse is an action on the accord. The second
situation offers several possibilities. Upon the debtor's default on
the accord the creditor may sue either on the accord or on the
original debt.70 Should the creditor default either by suing on
"Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Harmon, note 26, supra. The court
said. "The payment to the attorneys was a payment to their client, and
their possession was his possession. If he or they retained the money,
such retention was an acceptance of the tender, and if he was unwill-
ing to accept the tender, the only alternative was to promptly return
the money"
" WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1847 Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, sec. 419.
" WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1846, Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, sec. 418. The decisions of the Washington court in Rogers V.
Spokane, note 79, mnfra, and Joyner v. Seattle, note 80, znfra, indicate a
recognition of this rule.
'0WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1848; Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, sec. 417 (c).
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the original debt prior to maturity of the accord or by refusal
to accept performance of the accord and discharge the debt the
debtor has a cause of action for such breach, which cause of
action may either be prosecuted separately or interposed as a
counterclaim in the creditor's suit on the original debt.
71
The question whether an executory accord should be available
as a defense to an action on the original obligation has been the
subject of some discussion. It would seem that a promise by the
creditor to forbear suit on the original claim until default on
the accord or until a reasonable time has elapsed where no time
for performance is set by the accord, must be implied as an ele-
ment of the accord. "If anythng was intended by the arrange-
ment by both creditor and debtor it was that the debtor should
have immunity from suit on the original claim until he had de-
faulted on the new agreement." '72 Professor Williston has sug-
gested that the executory accord should be a defense and advocates
its specific performance in answer to a suit or threatened suit on
the original obligation.7 3 It is argued that the executory accord
should be admitted as a plea in abatement in defense of'an action
on the original claim. 74 The Restatement of the Law of Contracts 5
provides that "If the creditor breaks such a contract (the con-
tract of accord), the debtor's original duty is not discharged. The
debtor acquires a right of action for damages for the breach, and
if specific performance of that contract is practicable, he acquires
an alternative right to the specific enforcement thereof. If the
contract is enforced specifically, his original duty is discharged."
It should be noted here that the equity in such specific enforce-
ment lies in the nature of the accord. The inadequacy of the
remedy at law gives equitable jurisdiction.78  There need be no
unique subject matter or other traditional basis for equitable relief.
The weight of ease authority, Washington included, holds the
executory accord no defense.77 The same rule is applied even
"WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1840 and 1848; Restatement of the Law
of Contracts, sec. 417 (d).
Shepherd, "The Executory Accord," 26 Ill. Law Rev. 22.
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, see. 1845.
"Shepherd, "The Executory Accord," 26 Ill. Law Rev. 22.
Sec. 417 (d).
See the Comment on Clause (d), sec. 417, Restatement of the Law of
Contracts. In Collins v. Fidelity Trust Co., 33 Wash. 136, 73 Pac. 1121
(1903) specific performance of an accord was granted, but not as a de-
fense. The accord. contained several mutual promises, all of which, save
a promise by the defendant to assign a lease to plaintiff, had been per-
formed. Plaintiff was granted specific performance of the promise to
assign the lease. Where specific performance of the accord is sought as
a defense the debtor, facing actual or threatened suit on the original
debt, brings a bill for specific performance of the accord and injunction
against the creditor. Since the accord is no bar to a suit at law the
debtor's legal remedy is inadequate and there is equitable jurisdiction.
"WILLISTON oN CONTRACTS, sec. 1842.
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though the debtor has performed partly or tendered complete
performance.7 8
The plaintiff in Rogers v. Spokane79 sued to recover for per-
sonal injuries allegedly received through defendant's negligence.
In defense defendant pleaded an agreement between the parties
whereby plaintiff promised to accept $343.90 in full settlement
of his claim and defendant promised to pay that sum. The defense
was denied because
" it will be observed that the allegation of the affirma-
tive answer is not that the plaintiff agreed to accept the
agreement of the city council to pay him the sum of
$343.90 in discharge and satisfaction of his claim, but
that he agreed to receive the payment of the said sum
agreed upon in satisfaction of his claim. "
Similarly, in Joyner v. Seattle" an executory bilateral contract
between the parties, the creditor promising to accept $500 and
discharge his claim, and the debtor promising to pay that amount,
was held no bar to an action by the creditor on the original claim.
In neither of these cases was the debtor in default on the accord.
The creditor simply sued and recovered on the original claim
despite the accord. In neither case did the debtor attempt to
use the creditor's breach of the accord by way of counterclaim
although this procedure would no doubt have been available.8'
A year before Rogers v. Spokane was decided the Washington
court in Stayer & Walker v. Missimer"2 applied a rule which if
urged in the Rogers case might have produced a different result.
By the majority rule a contract to forbear suit temporarily will
not bar action on the claim involved although a minority of courts
hold to the contrary 88 There developed, however, as a part of
the law merchant the rule that an agreement supported by con-
sideration to extend the due date of a negotiable instrument can
be pleaded in bar to an action brought on the note prior to ex-
piration of the agreed extension period.8 4 This doctrine, it will
be noted, achieves the same result as that of the minority in con-
T' WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, see. 1843.
'1 9 Wash. 168, 37 Pac. 300 (1894).
80144 Wash. 641, 258 Pac. 479 (1927). See also Hackett 'v. McIntosh,
144 Wash. 104, 256 Pac. 1028 (1927) Here the defendant attempted to
use an executory accord as a defense and the court after finding there
was no accord, said " it did not amount to an agreement that the
appellant's present offer to perform would be accepted in satisfaction and
extinguishment of the original contract, but only that the performance
or doing of what he proposed would satisfy it."
8"WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1840.
8 6 Wash. 173, 32 Pac. 995, 36 A. S. R. 142 (1893).
' WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1844.
84 8 Corpus Juris 441.
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nection with simple contracts. Staver & Walker v. Misssmer was
an action on a note. An extension agreement was pleaded by the
defendant and judgment for hun might well have been put on
the general rule as to negotiable instruments. The court, however,
did not do so, but enunciated a rule broad enough to include any
sort of temporary forbearance contract.
"This is a new question in this state, and, being untram-
meled by precedent, we feel free to adopt the rule that
seems to us to be the most nearly- in accord with the gen-
eral principles of law applied by courts to the construc-
tion and enforcement of contracts, and we therefore decide
that a promise to forbear to sue for a definite time, where
the promise is based upon a sufficient consideration, can
be pleaded in bar to the action."
The court in reaching this conclusion relied chiefly on Robmnson
v. Godfrey,8 5 a Michigan case involving a simple contract.
It is possible that had the attention of the court deciding the
Royers case been called to the Missimer decision and the point
made that an accord of necessity implies an agreement by
the creditor to forbear suit on the original obligation the accord
in Rogers v. Spokane might. have been recognized as at least a
plea in abatement.
The language of Stayer & Walker v. Misssmer. was quoted ver-
batim in Commercial Bank v. Hart,88 an action on a note, and an
extension agreement sustained as a plea in bar. But by 1901 the
broader implications of the Aissimer decision seem lost and the
court in Price v. Mitchell87 sustained an extension agreement as a
plea in bar because
"Where there is a sufficient consideration to support an
agreement to extend the time for the payment of a note,
such agreement may be pleaded in bar to an action on
the note." (Citing Staver & Walker v. Misssmer)
Effect of Accord and Satisfactwin
It is well settled that satisfaction of the accord operates to dis-
charge the original debt and there are several Washington deci-
sions so holding.88 Washington also recognizes the rule that
discharge of a principal through accord and satisfaction releases
a52 Mlich. 408 (1852).
" 10 Wash. 303, 38 Pac. 1114 (1894).$723 Wash. 742, 63 Pac. 514 (1901).
"Brown v. Kern, note 16, supra, Williams v. Blumenthal, note 19,
supra, Rechel v. Jeffrey, 9 Wash. 250, 37 Pac. 296 (1894) Maynard 'U.
First Bank of Colton, 56 Wash. 486, 106 Pac. 182 (1910) Simons 'v. Halli-
die Co., 73 Wash. 499, 131 Pac. 1169 (1913) Pederson v. Tacoma, note 26,
supra, Plymouth Rubber Co. v. West Coast Rubber Co., note 13, supra;
Hewitt v. Jones, 149 Wash. 360, 271 Pac. 76 (1928) Heiand, v. Grun-
baum, note 39, supra.
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his guarantor and that such discharge of a joint obligor discharges
the other joint obligor."9
After performance of the accord the parties may not thereafter
contest the validity of the accounts so discharged. The defendant
in Hotel Randolph Co. v. John C Watros Co.9 0 interposed a de-
fense of accord and satisfaction which the creditor contested on
several grounds including the ground that a counterclaim allowed
the debtor in the alleged accord and satisfaction was in fact unen-
forceable because of the Statute of Frauds. Said the court
" after accord and satisfaction, one may not raise
the defense of the statute of frauds or any defense on the
merits to the issues which were originally in dispute.
That is fundamental, otherwise accord and satisfaction
would be a poor defense indeed."
The general rule in the United States holds a debtor discharged
by an accord and satisfaction between the creditor and a third
person and this is so even though the third person was not acting
as the debtor's agent either through prior authorization or subse-
quent ratification.9 The Restatement of the Law of Contracts
9 -2
states that "A payment or other performance by a third person,
accepted by a creditor as full or partial satisfaction of his claim,
discharges the debtor's duty in accordance with the terms on
which the third person offered it. But the debtor on learning of
the payment or other performance has power by disclaimer witlin
a reasonable time to make the payment or other performance in-
operative as a discharge." There are apparently no Washington
decisions on this point.
In the foregoing pages we have attempted to make a collection
and some analysis of the Washington cases in so far as they relate
to the substantive law and problems of accord and satisfaction.
Other problems of procedure incidentally related are treated in
a footnote.93  HAROLD SHEPHERD.*
WARREN SHATTUCK."
Keane v. Fidelity Savngs & Loan Assn., 173 Wash. 199, 22 Pac. (2d)
59 (1933).
'°Note 40, supra.
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1858.
Section 421.
13 "The question whether there has been an accord and satisfaction in
any given case is generally a mixed question of law and fact." First
National Bank v. White-Dulaney Co., note 40, supra, Kubey v. Coast
*Dean of the Law School, University of Washington.
-**Member of the senior class in the Law School, University of Wash-
ington and President of the Student Editorial Board of the WASHNGTON
LAW REVIEW. This article was written by Mr. Shattuck in the course of a
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